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see also 81-0826
DD/A Registry
81-0810
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FILE: Liaison
20 APR 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology

FROM: Max Hugel
Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT: Development and Engineering Support for the
Office of Security

1. The Office of Security (OS) has historically relied on your organization for both Research and Development (R&D) and Development and Engineering (D&E) services, with the Office of Research and Development (ORD) performing the R&D and the Office of Technical Service (OTS) providing D&E services. OS has generally been satisfied with the product of your R&D support and the process by which it is provided. That satisfaction is in contrast to some persistent problems that have plagued the D&E relationship between OS and OTS. For this reason, I believe that the Agency's physical and technical security program would benefit from a re-examination of the OS/OTS D&E partnership.

2. The relationship between OS and OTS has been characterized by cumbersome and often ineffective coordination resulting too often in unsatisfactory responses to OS requirements. This problem is, I am persuaded, one of process rather than of personalities. OS requirements are passed through ORD in their early stages and on to OTS for subsequent development. During this development process, communication tends to break down as inevitable rotations among OTS and OS personnel occur. Both precision and continuity are lost. Too often the final product is over-engineered, resulting in equipment costing far more than necessary and straying significantly from the original objective. Since OS also possesses capable engineering talents, it would appear to be far more effective and efficient to have those engineers who perceived the need in the first place, and who must work with the D&E product in the end, directly involved in D&E efforts rather than observing development efforts from afar through a middleman filter.

3. What is striking about your support to OS is that it was unaffected by either the creation or the disestablishment of the Development and Engineering Group (DEG) of the Office of Development and Engineering. I can only assume that the latter

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resulted from a desire to put D&E closer to the customer. That approach, it seems to me, exploits the technical strengths of the end user, and I would like to see it extended to cover OS.

4. I, therefore, propose that OS rely upon the DDS&T for R&D support, including the creation of prototypes, and that OS assume responsibility for all of its own D&E needs. Such a change appears consistent with your earlier decisions to move D&E responsibility from DEG back to user offices. Your approval for this change, including the transfer of funds already programmed for OS support will, I think, result in a more effectively and efficiently managed program.

/s/ Max Hugel

Max Hugel

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Director of Security

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